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Foundation Networks and American
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Inderjeet Parmar
 
Introduction
1 Thomas  Risse-Kappen  suggests  that  the  impact  of  transnational  groups  is  too
infrequently researched. That is, more study is needed of the domestic and international
conditions in which such groups succeed/fail.1 While there are more such studies since
1995,2 there remains a failure to consider the significance of  American philanthropic
foundations to building and embedding American hegemony. There are insights provided
by studying foundations’ roles in US hegemony building that we do not perceive when we
neglect those organisations. In particular, the foundations constructed and sustained the
rich texture of cooperative social, intellectual and political relations between key actors
and institutions supportive of specific modes of thought that promoted US hegemony.
Foundations also fostered and developed the attractive power-knowledge networks that
not  only radiated intellectual  influence but  also attracted some of  the most  creative
minds.  Finally,  liberal  internationalist  foundations  fostered globalism even when the
American state was ‘isolationist’, and when US influence abroad unwelcome.    
2 “Hegemony” here is understood as a set of processes by which a group, class or state –
through a combination of persuasion and coercion – is able to attain “buy in” from other
groups, classes or states for its own objectives, values and interests. In order to establish
hegemony, the hegemonic power or group normally culturally, intellectually, financially,
or militarily penetrates the target group or society/state, thereby providing significant
impetus  in  socialising elements  in  the  target  group.  While  there  is  a  bargain struck
between hegemonic forces and target groups, it is normally characterised by inequality of
rewards.  This  is  a  broad concept  of  hegemony that  is  supported by Gramscians  and
liberals.3
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3 This article makes two empirical  claims about the processes of  American hegemony-
construction and draws significant theoretical conclusions that undermine conventional
ways  of  viewing  state-private  relations  as  well  as  blurring  the  distinction  between
domestic forces and international factors as determinants of political outcomes. Bridging
both sets of relations – state/private and inside out/outside in – is the “elite network”, a
technology of power, in the present case, funded, fostered and sustained by philanthropic
foundation  largesse.  The  first  and  general  empirical  claim  is  that  philanthropic
foundations were/are significant forces in American society and, equally importantly,
their  significance  in  American  hegemony  building  lay  in  their  sustained,  long-term
cooperative relationship with the American state. The second, more specific, empirical
claim  is that  through  such  sustained  cooperation,  the  foundations  helped  to  build
national,  international  and global  institutions and networks through which American
hegemony  was,  at  the  very  least,  attempted.  The  latter  process  evidences  the  most
significant impact of US foundations – the building of the domestic and international
infrastructure for liberal internationalism which has transformed into a kind of “social
neoliberalism”.4 The theoretical conclusions follow from these claims: the sustained and
deep cooperation between the state and foundations suggests that we must revise our
views of “how power works” in the United States and therefore influences its foreign
relations. Realist and neo-Realist accounts of power are undermined by the long-term
mutual dependence of state and foundation in building/attempting American hegemony,
a relationship within which the state has benefited significantly from the apparently
private character of the foundations. The evidence presented below also challenges other
accounts of state-private relations that posit either sharply-drawn boundaries between
state/society or adversarial relations – most specifically realism/statism, neopluralism
and instrumental  Marxism.5 Instead,  the  evidence  suggests  the  greater  usefulness  of
accounts that blur public-private boundaries. Although there are several such approaches
– parastates, epistemic communities, corporatism, and foreign policy establishment - a
neo-Gramscian approach offers a more comprehensive understanding of  state-private
relations  and  American  power.  This  approach  sees  power  as  increased  through
cooperation. Although international factors played key roles in changing the external and
domestic behaviour of  the American state,  domestic elite internationalist  groups also
played vital roles, in cooperation with the state, by building the preconditions for US
globalism: mobilising elite/mass opinion, promoting the intellectual bases, institutions,
and networks that  undergirded globalism,  creating/improving the state’s  knowledge/
research capacities at critical times, and building international institutions in which they
worked to embed American values/interests.6 This tends further to undermine realist
accounts without suggesting that state power is irrelevant or unimportant. Finally, the
“elite network” concept, in addition to showing how interpenetrated are the state and
elite  private  groups,  also  shows  how  elite  networks  collapse  or  at  least  blur  the
distinctions between domestic society and international  affairs.  Therefore,  the article
shows that elite networks, consisting of state officials and private citizens are powerful
means by which foreign policy shifts may be prepared, elite and mass opinion primed and
mobilised, new consensus built, ‘old’ forces marginalised, and US hegemony constructed.
In sum, the article builds on and synthesises the conceptualisations of Risse-Kappen –
inside/outside, state-private, and the importance of transnational relations - and Haas –
epistemic communities and networks,7 but within a broader neo-Gramscian framework.
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4 This  article,  first,  suggests  the  foundations’  significance;  secondly,  briefly  discusses
theoretical  approaches  conducive  to  understanding  cooperative  state-  private
relationships;  thirdly,  discusses  the  foundations’  use  of  networks  to  promote  their
influence and to build hegemony. Thereafter, the article considers the empirical evidence
of  the  foundations’  roles  in  America’s  rise  to  globalism  in  three  historical  phases
(1920s-1950s,  1930s-1970s,  and  since  the  late  1980s)  and  at  three  levels  (domestic,
international and global). Finally, it moves to a conclusion.   
 
The Foundations’ Significance
5 American  hegemony  was  neither  attempted  nor  constructed  only  on  coercive  or
corporate power but also, and in combination with, the nation’s socialisation capabilities
as embodied in various kinds of frequently-neglected but influential  non-state actor.8
Specifically, this article focuses on the role in America’s rise to globalism of philanthropic
foundations  –  especially  the  so-called  ‘Big  3’, Carnegie,  Ford  and  Rockefeller,  the
philosophies of which were formed at the turn of the twentieth-century. Rockefeller and
Carnegie philanthropy led the way to “scientific giving”, and Ford more or less followed
when  it  became  nationally  and  globally  active  in  the  early  1950s.  Pragmatic  and
utilitarian, elitist and technocratic in outlook, the foundations aimed to invest in ideas
and “put  knowledge to  work” to  reform society,  economy and politics  at  home and
abroad. With endowments in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the Big 3 championed
generating  positivistic  ‘scientific’  knowledge  that  would  be  of  practical  use  to
policymakers, urban planners, and state-builders. Self-confident, optimistic and armed
with  the  findings  of  social  sciences  like  sociology,  economics  and  political  science,
foundation leaders rarely consulted those at whom their programmes of reform were
targeted and on whose behalf they claimed to be acting.9
6 In  effect,  the  major  foundations  played  critical  roles  in  constructing  national,
international and global institutional structures that first, boosted US federal executive
power at a time when the federal government was weak and the individual states of the
union strong,  actively undermining and marginalising parochialism and ‘isolationism’
and promoting liberal internationalism; secondly, foundations played significant roles in
promoting  American  power  in  and  through  newly-constructed  informal  and  formal
international organisations; and finally, since the 1980s, they promoted an increasingly
‘global’ set of institutions that may constitute a nascent ‘global civil society’.10 The latter
represents at a global level the project of a century ago that the foundations embarked
upon  at  home:  at  a  time  of  weak  federal/global  institutions  and  strong  states,  to
strengthen the former at the expense of the latter and build a sustainable national/global
civil society. The reconstruction and partial transfer of sovereignty – from states of the
union to Washington, DC, and from other national states to global institutions,11 is the
underlying logic of these developments. The foundations’ principal technology was, and
is, the ‘network’, specifically the heavily politicised knowledge network. 
7 Non-state actors have frequently been identified as critical to US power and to global
politics.12 Specifically,  the roles of America’s foremost philanthropic foundations have
been neglected, even in studies that otherwise emphasise the importance of non-state
actors. Yet, as this article makes clear, studying foundations provides insights into the
‘mindset’ and activities of America’s hegemony- planners and –builders over time, and
indicates foundations’ strategic significance in mediating and articulating components of
Foundation Networks and American Hegemony
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
3
the  US  state  and  private  elites,  in  cohering  the  foreign  policy  ‘establishment’.  Four
characteristics – or “fictions” - of the Big 3 foundations account for their significance, all
related to their apparent independence: first, the “non-state” fiction, at odds with their
trustees’  ‘statist’  mindset  and  their  governmental  connections;  secondly,  the  “non-
political” fiction, despite connections with both main political parties; thirdly, the “non-
business”  fiction,  irrespective  of  corporate directorships  and income-  sources  among
trustees; and finally, the “scientific/non-ideological” fiction, despite attachment to the
ideology of Americanism as liberal internationalism.13 Additionally, their adaptability and
sense  of  historic  mission  –  changing  tactics,  same  programme14 –  meant  that  they
successfully  negotiated  their  way  through  the  frequently  hostile  environment  and
turbulence of American domestic politics and the equally turbulent wider world. Such
ability during the isolationist  1920s and 1930s provides insights into how foundation
programmes and tactics would successfully adapt in states designated as ‘anti-American’
during the cold war era. In each such case, foundations showed significant tenacity, tact
and adaptability in allying with any non-hostile public agency that furthered their goals
and prepared for a future more permissive climate.  
8 Holding  such fictions  as  articles  of  faith  permits  foundations  to  act  as  unifiers  of  a
political system divided by sovereignties, characterised by mass democracy, and group
competition. Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies mediate between the concerns
of  state,  big  business,  party  politics  and foreign policy-related  academia;  articulate a
divided system; and constitute and create forums for constructing elite consensus and
forward policy planning.  Nevertheless, foundation networks did not always succeed and,
importantly, were most successful in conditions of crisis15 – such as the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the sudden outbreak of the Korean War, and after the end of the
cold war. However, the foundations have been adept at network-building during non-
crises  and  are  well  prepared  to  interpret  and  promote  crises  as  opportunities  to
policymakers and public alike.16   
9 America’s journey to global leadership – hegemony - may be tracked through the rise of
the major foundations through three overlapping but distinct stages/levels, with each
stage socialising elites at home and abroad, and embedding liberalism into national and
international institutions: stage 1, at domestic level, from the 1920s to the 1950s, during
which  the  foundations  helped  construct  the  domestic  hegemony  of  liberal
internationalism, marginalised isolationism, and built up the institutional capacities of
the federal government,  especially in foreign affairs;  stage 2 from the 1930s to 1970s
during  which  foundations  helped  integrate  American  and  foreign  elites  and,  very
significantly,  developed  formal  and  informal  international  organisations  for  elites’
socialisation and integration; and stage 3 from the late 1980s when foundations have been
strategically  important  in  attempting  to  build  ‘global  civil  society’  particularly  in
fostering ‘democratic’ forums ‘challenging’ neo-liberal globalisation.17 Underpinning the
century-long ‘hegemonic project’ is liberal internationalism though it is also clear that
this school of thought and action represented a fairly ‘nationalist internationalism’.18 The
international/global orders constructed or aimed at were, and are, congenial to American
economic and other interests.19
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Theoretical approaches
10 The indispensability of private elite organizations to state legitimacy are central to this
study. The cooperative inter-relationship of the American state with elite foreign affairs
organizations blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors and calls into
question  theories  (such  as  neopluralism,  statism,  and  instrumental  Marxism)20 that
advance a zero-sum view of power. Cooperative state-private elite networks have played
a powerful historical role in mobilizing for US global expansionism and such network
construction is  best  explained by  concepts  that  emphasise  shared and mutual  state-
private elite interests. The advantages to the state of such arrangements were/are that
official policy objectives – overseas intelligence gathering, promotion of pro-American
interests – could be advanced by purportedly unofficial means.21 American foundations
were/are,   particularly  close  to  the  state  and,  therefore,  provide  illustrative  cases  of
public-private “bridging” organisations.
11 According  to  Mann,  one  of  the  most  significant  powers  of  the  modern  state is  its
infrastructural  capacity,  in  addition to  its  coercive  power.  That  is,  the  state  reaches
deeply into its  “own” society and draws upon popular  legitimacy,  in addition to tax
revenues.22 Gramsci,  conversely,  maintains  that  dominant  classesestablish  private
institutions fundamental to state power.23 Elite self-organisation and the organization of
private  life  by  state  agencies  creates  the  basis  of  interpenetrated  organizations  and
networks,  with  far-reaching  consequences,  forcing  scholars  to  reconceptualise  state-
private relations to better understand “how power works” in democracies. 
12 This  article,  therefore,  explores  four  major  conceptualizations  that  emphasise  state-
private  cooperation  and then goes  on  to  suggest  that,  despite  their  strengths,  their
insights may be comprehensively subsumed within a neo-Gramscian analysis. The role of
the  following  four  conceptualisations,  therefore,  is  principally  to  place  a  lot  more
empirical/historical flesh on what are broader, more abstract Gramscian categories. 
 
The Establishment
13 According to Hodgson, the “Establishment” works behind the scenes and is composed of
three core  groups:  internationally-minded lawyers,  bankers  and corporate  executives
from  New  York;  government  officials  from  Washington,  DC;  and  elite  university
academics and foundation heads. These three groups were united, Hodgson argues, by a
common  history  (WWII  /cold  war),  policy  (internationalism),  aspiration  (world
leadership), instinct (centrist), and technique (working through the federal executive).24 
14 The US  foreign policy  Establishment  is  a  self-recruiting  bi-partisan  group exercising
practical influence on defence and foreign policy. Hodgson’s conceptualisation fits neatly
the foreign policy roles of the Big 3 foundations, which saw themselves as bipartisan,
ideology-free, opposed to isolationism but supportive liberal-internationalism, as well as
working to attain and maintain American global  leadership.  Foundation leaders were
drawn from similar  elite  backgrounds  to  those of  Hodgson’s  Establishment.  Hodgson
identifies the cohesive elite forces in American society that bridge the gap between state
and society.  Although neo-Gramscians – whose perspective is  detailed below -  would
expect an historic bloc to be broader than Hodgson’s Establishment – for example, to
include  labour  and  racial  minorities  –  they  find  Hodgson’s  concept  useful  within  a
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broader formulation because it permits specific historicisation of Gramscian abstractions.
It also shows that non-Gramscians too recognise that there is indeed disproportionate
power wielded by unrepresentative elites working outside the constitutional processes.    
 
The Corporatist School
15 Sharing common elements with this approach, corporatism offers a number of different
insights to state-society relations. Corporatism is a variant of weak-state pluralist theory.
However,  corporatism  emphasizes  mechanisms  for  conflict-management  and
collaboration between functional  blocs  (corporations,  government,  organized labour).
Functional  blocs  cooperate  better  to  manage  economic  affairs  and  socio-political
transformations, to promote political stability.25 
16 The corporatist  analysis  fits  within a  neo-Gramscian framework.  Indeed,  corporatists
such  as  Ferguson  and  McCormick,  allude  to  the  connections  between  the  two
perspectives. Ferguson actually uses the term ‘historic bloc’ for the New Deal coalition
built by President Roosevelt.26 The enlightened self-image of the “organisational sector”
accords with Gramscian “state spirit” while corporatists’ emphasis on the coalescence of
interests  between  internationally-oriented,  capital-intensive  industries  and  financial
institutions, as well as organised labour – are fundamental elements of Gramsci’s historic
bloc. What is missing, however, is any compelling account of the role of intellectuals in
the American system,27 a major advantage of Gramscian analysis. 
 
Para-states
17 The Progressive era witnessed the rise of  a variety of  reform-oriented organisations,
including professional associations and foundations, which attempted to relieve poverty,
promote  moral  renewal,  reform government/politics,  and transform America’s  world
role.28 Eldon Eisenach calls these organizations “parastates” because they stood for the
“national public good”, whereas the main political parties and legislatures were corrupt
and  parochial.  Working  outside  the  established  channels  of  the  party  machine  and
electoral politics, parastates favoured extending federal executive authority.29 
18 Parastates made no distinction between themselves and “the state” which they saw in
Hegelian terms: the state, constructed by and of the people, and requiring obedience. The
“good citizen”, therefore, is “state-oriented”, seeking to achieve a larger public good. But
this, in the Progressive era, was the aspiration blocked by corrupt and parochial parties
and  legislatures,  while  the  federal  executive  and  a  mobilisable  public  offered
opportunities. The interests of a weak federal state and of active parastates coalesced
around  opinion  mobilization:  the  parastates  would  educate  public  opinion  behind  a
reformist agenda at home, through a strong federal state, and the export of American
values abroad. “Good citizens” would staff the most statist public offices and exercise
citizenship in publicly oriented private organizations.
19 Eisenach’s approach resonates with the role of twentieth-century American foundations
and  with  Gramscian  theory:  parastates’  state-orientation  is  remarkably  similar  to
Gramsci’s  state  spirit,  suggesting  that  Gramsci’s  concepts  offer  insights  to  analysing
power  in  the  US.  However,  the  greater  comprehensiveness  of  Gramsci’s  theoretical
framework effectively subsumes but  also effectively articulates  the concepts  outlined
above, permitting thereby a more comprehensive, coherent, and critical study of power.
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20 Establishment-men,  corporatist  organisational  sector-ists,  and  parastates  may  see
themselves  as  neutral  and  disinterested  but  Gramscian  analysis  allows  us  better  to
contextualise and interrogate such self-images, especially by assessing those individuals
and groups within the structure of economic, political and ideological power.
 
Epistemic Communities
21 Epistemic communities  are networks of  specialists  with a  common world view about
cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common
political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied.30 Epistemic
communities  are  value/knowledge  based  special  interests  in  the  pluralistic  mould,
seeking to influence the state, with influence, if any, flowing from the private group to
the state. However, a more nuanced version of the concept may be more helpful to this
study.
22 One aspect of the concept of epistemic communities argues for a “two-tier” dynamic
within knowledge groups:  the first tier consists of government officials,  international
agencies, and corporate executives; the second of academics, lawyers, and journalists.
Both tiers share a common conceptual framework but operate within an agreed division
of labour: government officials have access to policymaking and use the second tier to
publicise/disseminate their ideas and to legitimate them as “objective and scientific”, as
well as to elaborate on public officials’ ideas. Additionally, the second tier’s ideas were
brought to government officials and decision-makers as evidence of a growing consensus.
23 When such interactions are successfully concluded, they lead to the institutionalization of
the epistemic community’s “policy paradigm” and incorporation of experts into direct
state service.31
24 As intellectuals, think tanks and university research institutes were and are such key
features of  US foreign cultural  affairs,  it  is  clear that  state-private networks may be
conceptualized within the epistemic community model. In relation to Gramscian thought,
however, the epistemic communities concept is limited – it contains no general theory of
power or the state nor of  the interconnections of  ‘multiple’  sources of  power in the
corporate economy, the academy, and so on. Placed in a Gramscian context, however, it
becomes  a  more  usable  empirical  concept  that  says  something  about  the  precise
character of state-private networks.
 
A neo-Gramscian perspective 
25 Although the four concepts agree on most matters, they divide on the issue of locating
the sources of the elite.  Hodgson’s Establishment and the corporatists’  organizational
sector are the most economistic; the former two favour the idea that elites are, in part,
sourced from capital-intensive, international manufacturers and banks. By so doing, the
two relevant concepts move closer to a more radical interpretation of power. In addition,
Gramsci’s little-examined notion of “state spirit” – which is further explained below –
offers a new insight into understanding state-society relations that, to be sure, is hinted
at in several of the four concepts examined above but never satisfactorily articulated. 
26 The Gramscian view,  though founded on an economistic  analysis  of  power,  makes  a
radical departure by noting the existence of important protective layers of pro-bourgeois
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ideology and institutions that shape consciousness in favour of the status quo. Gramsci
located ideological, political and cultural struggle more centrally into Marxist thought,
thereby elevating the role of intellectuals.
27 Gramsci argues that there is no simple way objectively to define capitalist interests – in
economic or political terms – and that interests are a matter of debate and interpretation.
It is the role of “organic intellectuals” to develop and disseminate dominant ideas, to
make “commonsense” what are, in reality, ideas that principally support the ruling class.
28 Politics and the state are not automatic reflections of unequal class relations but sites of
struggle between rival  ideas and regimes.  Through bargaining and building enduring
coalitions  that  cut  across  class  and  ethno-  racial  cleavages,  is  formed the  dominant
concept that underlies a particular set of political and economic arrangements, a regime.
As political regimes – or hegemonic projects and alliances - are made up of cross-class
coalitions, they require public opinion mobilizations to convince the masses – or at least a
critical proportion of them – that they have a stake in current arrangements. In short, the
coalition – or historic bloc – is generated and sustained by the “consent of the governed”,
under the hegemonic leadership of politicians and intellectuals of the capitalist class.
29 As  popular  consent  is  so vital  to  political  arrangements,  it  is  engineered32 by  elites
through numerous  channels  that  involve  the  state  and organizations  that  Hodgson’s
Establishment,  the  corporatists’  organizational  sector,  Eisenach’s  parastates  and  the
epistemic  communities  would  recognise:  elite  universities,  the  CFR,  and  the  major
foundations.
30 Hegemony  is  constructed  by  an  alliance  of  state  elites  and  private  ruling  class
organizations in order to undermine the old order and to usher in the new. Central to the
motivation of private elites is Gramsci’s concept of “state spirit” which infuses every
successful social movement. State spirit inspires leaders to take personally the concerns
of the nation and state, and to subordinate narrow interests to the broader interests of
the state/nation. State-spirited leaders contextualize themselves in the broad sweep of
national  and  global  historical  development:  their  outlook  “presupposes  ‘continuity’,
either with the past… or with the future….”33 Such leaders and intellectuals may even
come to believe “that they are the State…”34
 
Network building: the foundations’ principal function   
31 Integrating  elites  behind  particular  hegemonic  projects  has  been  the  foundations’
principal long-term function. Foundations have constructed domestic and international
knowledge networks, both as ends in themselves and as means to their ends. Networks
are  a  technology  of  power  that  produces  significant  hegemonic  outcomes.  Briefly,
networks  are  “systems  of  coordinated  research,  disseminated  and  published  results,
study and often graduate  level  teaching,  intellectual  exchange,  and financing,  across
national boundaries.”35 Networks normally include official  policy-makers and perform
two broad but vital functions: internal and external.
32 Internal functions refer to what the network does as a system of scholar, knowledge, and
money flows, inter-institutional connections, and as a source of attraction. For example,
one  of  the  functions  of  networks  is  to  incorporate  and  socialise  scholars  through
providing research funds and career-building structures such as professional societies,
conferences, and journals. Networks build careers and as individuals progress through
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the ranks, the structural probabilities for radically different thinking rapidly diminish.
Added  to  this  is  the  increasingly  policy-oriented  or  at  least  utilitarian  character  of
academic  knowledge  production  –  favoured  by  foundations  –  that  scholars  are
(structurally) socialised or incentivised to conduct. Therefore, such socialising structures
tend to have politically-moderating effects on scholars, scholarship and political action.36
33 External functions refers to the external image of the network’s members as sources of
symbolic capital, producers of prestigious, legitimate knowledge taken seriously by all,
especially policy-makers.37 Foundation-funded knowledge networks clearly regulate the
“free” market of ideas, the intellectual environment within which “thinkable thought”
occurs38 which  affects  the  network’s  ability  to  reproduce  itself  by  assimilating  new
generations  of  scholars,  strengthen  self-awareness,  reinforce  common  language  and
codes and, importantly, to engage in intellectual combat with opponents. A key function –
the ‘darker’ side of the publicly-declared purpose of philanthropy - is more controversial
and  is  publicly  unstated:  to  bolster  US  hegemony  by  promoting  specific  forms  of
cooperation and integration for achieving nationalistic, rather than philanthropic, ends.
34 Together, the internal and external functions of foundations were/are the basis of elite
integration and of others’ marginalisation. In periods of crisis, however, when old ideas
appear inadequate in addressing problems, foundations incorporate critical thinkers to
contribute to problem-solving. In the process, however, some radicals are incorporated,
‘domesticated’ and rendered “safe”.
35 Networks distribute material rewards and incentives, bestow status and prestige, that
powerfully motivate particular kinds of research. Materially and honorifically, networks
are hierarchical systems. They, therefore, become important sources of symbolic capital
and  radiate  intellectual  influence.  Symbolic  capital,  in  turn,  helps  strengthen  the
influence of networks in their role as gatekeepers of ideas, bestowers of legitimacy for
certain kinds of thinking, implicitly or explicitly undermining others. This combines to
produce political influence, moving network members and organisations closer to the
centres of power. 
36 The Big 3 behaved this  way because they are a part  of  the American ‘power elite’,39
especially significant within the east coast foreign policy ‘establishment’.40 The major
foundations are  outgrowths of  the corporate  giants  of  the late  nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, organisations imbued with the ‘scientific spirit’ of the Progressive
era.41 They mobilised scientific knowledge to manage the potentially catastrophic socio-
political  effects  of  socio-economic  change:  industrialisation,  mass  immigration,
urbanisation and the attendant rise of radical political movements.42 They also pioneered
scientific  ‘giving’,  management,  and  social  engineering  to  inaugurate  a  reformed
economic and political order.43
37 Additionally,  the  foundations  are  unrepresentative  elite  institutions:  their  trustees
affiliated with Wall St. banks and law firms, service in the State Department, connections
with  the  leaders  of  both  main  political  parties,  the  national  press,  and  ‘Ivy  League’
universities.44 Demographically,  their  trustees have been overwhelmingly male,  white
Anglo-Saxon protestants (Wasps), educated at elite schools and universities, and patrons
of exclusive clubs.45 By the 1920s, such groups believed that they, American elite, had
‘come of age’ and were fit to lead the world: America was more advanced industrially and
socially, more open and democratic, and generally more dynamic. Opposed to moribund
empires and atheistic communism, for east coast elites America represented a new way
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forward for a world of peace and prosperity.46 American internationalism, embedded in
American-led international organisations, was the way forward.47
38 This article provides examples to argue that foundations, in cooperation with the state,
played critical  roles  in America’s  rise  to global  hegemony,  and achieved this  in part
through  building  coalitions  that  comprised  intellectuals  (academics,  students),  state
agencies, corporation executives, organised labour, racial minorities, and others. Such
networks bridged state-private and inside-outside divisions and show that state power
with (rather than over or against)  private elite action created the bases of  American
hegemony.  The  article  is  structured according  to  the  periodisation presented  above:
1920s-1950s,  national/domestic  network-building  for  liberal  internationalism  and
marginalising  isolationism;  1930s-1970s,  international  network-building;  and  1980s-
present, global network-building. Network-building as a socialising instrument did not,
by  itself,  generate  US  ‘hegemony’  though it  was  a  pre-condition  of  it.  The  flows  of
material incentives – grants, jobs, fellowships - integral to network-building clearly
played a role. Both foundation network-building and the rise of America to globalism
were also symbiotically connected to catalytic global events: the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor in December, 1941, for example; the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and
the adoption of NSC-68;48 9-11. Such catalytic events afforded precious opportunities to
those forces that were best prepared to take advantage of the spaces opened up for ‘new’
thinking, often considered ‘unthinkable’ before the ‘crisis’.
 
National Networks, 1920s-1950s
39 This period witnessed a massive effort at national network-building by foundations in the
United States. Rockefeller and Carnegie funded liberal internationalist/anti-isolationist
think  tanks,  university  research  institutes,  and  publicity  organisations:  CFR  (1921),
Foreign  Policy  Association  (FPA,  1918),  League  of  Nations  Association  (1923),  and
numerous  World  Affairs  Councils.49 Such  efforts  of  the  interwar  years  indicate
foundations’ adaptability to hostile domestic political conditions: to zealously foster a
counter-hegemony against isolationism and for internationalism, patiently awaiting the
day when their message would be sympathetically received. By so doing, the foundations
built an historic bloc behind the hegemonic project of liberal internationalist globalism
(and anti-isolationism), that consisted of corporations, organised labour, intellectuals/
students, and racial minorities, for example. Such groupings, with their varied interests,
were  leashed  to  the  globalist  vision  that  included  an  open  trading  system,  full
employment,  anti-fascism  abroad  and  anti-racism  at  home,  and  world  peace
underwritten by American power. Thus, their vision was global, paying little heed to the
so-called domestic/international divide.  
40 Concretely  to  promote  liberal  internationalism,  Carnegie  philanthropies  supported
numerous universities in establishing foreign affairs/international relations courses in
the 1920s and 1930s, as well as local library ‘international corners’ and radio broadcasts
across  the  country.50 The  crowning  achievements  of  this  ‘movement’  were  the  Yale
Institute of International Studies51 and the programmes established at Princeton under
the  leadership  of  Edward Meade  Earle:  together,  Yale  and Princeton led  the  way  in
establishing  international  relations  as  an  academic  discipline  and,  even  more
significantly, in establishing Realism – the centrality and inevitability of power politics and
the  necessity  of  American  global  interventionism -  as  the  discipline’s  dominant  postwar
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paradigm.52The  Yale  Institute’s  ‘independent’  status  also  helped  legitimize  its  views.
Specifically, there was little public acknowledgement of its continuous connections with
either the Foundation or with the American state.   The Institute trained hundreds of
undergraduates  and  dozens  of  graduate  students  for  state  service  or  academia  -
furthering the influence of  its  Realist  approach.  By 1948,  YIIS began a journal,  World
Politics, and ran one of the most prestigious programmes of postgraduate research and
training in America.53 Well-known IR alumni include Bernard C. Cohen, Lucian Pye and
William C.  Olson.54 Other alumni went on to join important US foreign policy-related
institutions  such  as  the  CFR,  FPA,  Foreign  Service,  and  State  Department.55 The
experience of the Yale Institute demonstrates the valued place of utilitarian knowledge-
production in Rockefeller’s  priorities,  as  well  as  the importance of  building powerful
national networks based on “centres of excellence”.
41 Additionally, the early stirrings of the massive postwar Area Studies phenomenon were
the work of the big foundations from as early as the 1930s, in the case of Soviet Studies,56
as  was  their  postwar  development  and maturity.  Asian,  African,  and Latin American
Studies  thrived  as  those  regions  became objects  of  American  attention  due  to  their
strategic location, raw materials, market potential, or place in cold war competition. For
example,  a  Carnegie  Corporation  internal  report  by  Columbia  University  historian,
Nathaniel  Peffer,  concluded  that,  “the  [Rockefeller  and  Carnegie-  funded  American]
Institute [of Pacific Relations, AIPR] has been the means of increasing consciousness of
the Far East in the United States.” Peffer credited the AIPR with having inspired the
increased  teaching  of  Pacific  area  studies  and  the  establishment  of  Far  Eastern
departments in schools, colleges and universities, a claim also backed up by more recent
scholarship.57 After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the AIPR became an essential
part  of  the  administration’s  war  effort.  Its  research  programme  was  increasingly
“determined by Government needs” because the AIPR was the “only agency [with]
considerable … information about the area.”58 As the Office of War Information, the Office
of  Strategic  Services,  and  the  armed  forces  increased  their  demand  for  the  AIPR’s
research and knowledge, the Corporation stepped up its support.59 
42 Located at prestigious universities such as Harvard, Columbia and Chicago, area studies
programmes featured funded chairs, departments, professional associations, conferences,
doctoral students and research fellowships.60 Relatively small investments had powerful
‘multiplier’ effects as the symbolic power of the Ivy league encouraged other elite and
non-elite universities to invest in their own area studies programmes.61 The foundations’
efforts in this area were assisted by regular advice and encouragement by an enlarged
postwar State Department that yearned for trained graduate students for public service
and  a  more  internationally-conscious  American  public.  The  State  Department  more
closely oriented the teaching of IR at Yale, for example, to the Department’s concerns. In
1944, a committee investigated “what the educational process can do to produce good
decision-makers in the field of international relations”, mainly to improve the calibre of
graduate students  entering government  service and to provide in-service training to
practising diplomats.62
43 In addition, the strongly pro-interventionist foundations actively funded in the mid- to
late-1930s campaigns to ‘educate’ various elements of elite opinion, particularly pacifist
and isolationist students at leading universities, and regional notables in isolationist parts
of the United States.63  The League of Nations Association, for example, which was heavily
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, sponsored college-based Model League of Nations
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Assemblies and ran national competitions for school children.64 The aim was “to train an
elite to think, feel and act internationally.”65
44 By 1939,  when the  isolationist-interventionist  debates  were  at  their  most  fierce,  the
foundations’  funded organisations to press the case for American belligerence and to
crush the case for isolation and neutrality, such as the Committee to Defend America by
Aiding the Allies (CDAAA) and the Fight For Freedom (FFF). The pro-interventionist and
anti-isolationist CDAAA and FFF reached out to numerous groups in American society,
including organised labour and, for the first time, African-Americans.66 The warhawks
organised black branches in Harlem and Chicago, alongside two chapters at historically-
black universities (Howard and Lincoln). Having few connections with the black masses,
they sought to mobilise the leaders of black opinion  - trades union leaders (A. Philip
Randolph), churchmen (Adam Clayton Powell), academics (Ralph Bunche), and newspaper
editors.67
45 The CDAAA/FFF black mobilisation campaign linked the fight against Hitlerism with the
struggle  against  domestic  racial  discrimination.  The  warhawks'  leaders  were  highly
critical of America's past record in racial matters, and hoped to wean black Americans
away from perceived 'indifference' to Hitlerism or active support for isolationism and
communism.68 In  addition,  they  saw  continuing  racial  discrimination  in  the  defence
industries as divisive and inefficient as it diminished maximum production efforts. It was
in  this  area  that  FFF,  in  particular,  made  a  significant  contribution  by  supporting
President Roosevelt' s Executive Order 8802 (in 1941) banning such discrimination. It is
also clear that the warhawks recognised the importance attached to domestic US race
relations by the peoples of Asia and Africa, and used the opportunities offered by the War
to try to promote civil rights reforms.69
46 The effects of work among black Americans provided elite blacks a forum to express their
views, linked to a national organisation; made an important contribution to debate in the
black press; established a potential channel for recruiting black leaders into the American
state;  and challenged community indifference and/or isolationism. Finally,  the lesson
learned by east coast elites from the experience must be appreciated: domestic racial
matters  were  now  considered  in  the  context  of  America's  global  image,  further
undermining the ‘separation’ of domestic and global affairs.70   
47 In combination, the above efforts – foundation investments in knowledge networks and
their multiplier effects – helped to promote liberal internationalism and to marginalise
isolationism, and helped boost the knowledge/research capacities of the Department of
State. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that those networks were the necessary
pre-conditions for America’s rise to globalism, not the ‘cause’: the ‘causes’ were in great
part dependent on catalytic events and, even more importantly, the way national political
leaders interpreted ‘catalytic’ events as opportunities for promulgating radical alterations
to the foreign policy ‘status quo’. It was, and is, the combination of prior preparation and
organisational capacity, not to mention ‘missionary zeal’, with the successful ‘selling’ of a
plausible interpretation of spectacular events, usually attacks represented as a longer-
term existential  threat  that  demands a  response,  that  leads to radical  foreign policy
shifts.
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International Networks, 1930s-1950s
48 Foundations’  national  and international  network-building initiatives  were  not  clearly
distinct  as  the  typology/periodisation  used  here  might  suggest.  Indeed,  foundation
leaders and their counterparts in their funded organisations agreed that their ‘national’
strategies dovetailed with their  international  hegemonic objectives.  Herein lies a key
point: that the Big 3 foundations and their networks were involved in a self-conscious
hegemonic project for globalism and against isolationism; their domestic activities were
aimed at promoting the idea that America was dependent on, and connected to, the world
and could no longer ignore world affairs. If America – the self-evident good country of the
‘chosen people’71 –  did  not  ‘nip’  global  threats  in  the bud,  it  would suffer  economic
hardships and threats of (or actual) military attack, as the forces of ‘evil’ would dominate
the globe.72 Indeed,  the overall  US-stated aim in the definitive cold war justification,
NSC-68, recognises a desire “to foster a world environment in which the American system
can flourish”, to be achieved through containing the USSR but also, “a policy we would
probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat …. [a] policy of attempting to develop a
healthy international community” of US-dominated organisations, such as the IMF, World
Bank, NATO, the Marshall Plan, and so on.73 Interventionism made (common) sense as the
world was getting smaller.74 It was seen by US state and private elites that leadership of
international  organisations constituted “from an American vantage a desirable world
order.”75 And in those world orders, international organisations were rarely permitted
independent  powers  and  the  US  always  (and  unsurprisingly)  “sought  to  protect  its
interests.” To Craig Murphy and Robert Cox, international organisations – such as the
International Labour Organisation and the League of Nations, represent the international
institutional  architecture  for  capitalist  accumulation  regimes.76 Relatedly,  James  T.
Shotwell, Columbia University historian and Carnegie Endowment representative at the
ILO,  noted  quite  explicitly  the  pro-capitalist  and  anti-communist  aims  of  the
organisation,  in  an  article  entitled  nothing  less  than,  “The  International  Labor
Organization as an Alternative to Violent Revolution”. In it, he argued that the Bolshevik
revolution,  worker unrest,  and political  instability across Europe forced labour issues
onto the Paris Peace Conference’s agenda. Subsequently, peacemakers worked to “prove
to the workers of the world that the principles of social  justice might be established
under the capitalist system”.77    
49 Those messages were relayed with all the skills and experience of modern advertising
techniques,  from the  crucible  of  personal  conversations  to  the  radio,  from the  local
library to the lecture theatre, from the board room to the factory floor,78 from White mid-
western isolationist heartlands to African-American enclaves in Chicago and New York
City.79
50 The  foundations’  international  network-building  was  as  strategic  as  their  national
enterprises. As Rockefeller officials noted when selecting London-based colleges (such as
the London School of Economics) for investment, that city’s institutions were already part
of a world-wide imperial network that offered significant advantages.  Influencing the
questions and methods of research at the heart of the British Empire meant multiplier
effects across the globe.80
51 The major American foundations also played key roles in generating several international
organisations in and through which their ideas and values could be expressed and the
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idea of international governance could be normalised, especially after the US senate’s
non-ratification of the League of Nations. Creating international forums for discussing
labour conditions, scientific papers, trade, legal norms, war debts, reparations, war, and
peace, provided opportunities for US elites to promote their own positions but also to try
and  cooperate  in  advancing  non-nationalist,  anti-colonial,  and  non-communist
arguments.  Despite  the  idealistic  character  of  the  declarations  of  American
internationalists, and of their more recent supporters,81 this was a bid for hegemony. As
Ikenberry notes, “Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the [potential]
hegemon’s vision of international order and accept it as their own…”82 He further notes
that  “the  ability  to  forge  a  consensus  among  national  elites  on  the  normative
underpinnings of order is an important if elusive dimension of hegemonic power.” Such
persuasion is conducted by “direct contact with elites in these states, including contact
via diplomatic channels, cultural exchanges, and foreign study.”83 He might have added
private international organisations to that list. For American internationalists, building
international organisations was for the purposes of what later became known as “track
two” diplomacy, where state and other elites meet informally to air differences during
protracted international negotiations between states.84
52 It  is  unsurprising,  therefore,  that  the  foundations  funded the  long-term cooperative
efforts  of  the  American  CFR  with  its  British  counterpart,  the  Royal  Institute  of
International Affairs (RIIA, also known as Chatham House).85 Founded as two branches of
one  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  the  CFR  and  Chatham House  became  national
organisations in the early 1920s. Nevertheless, their cooperation developed and became
‘special’: they were champions of Anglo-American cooperation and, indeed, alliance, as
the best way of combating ‘aggressors’ and securing world peace and prosperity. They
established joint conferences and study groups from the 1920s right into the cold war,
informal and semi-formal diplomacy that shadowed their official counterparts in their
respective governments – for example, on naval matters, trade, war debts, postwar issues
in the Pacific region, etc… While they did not ‘resolve’ problems, they created spaces
within which policy-oriented elites were able frankly to air their grievances and indicate
how much political room for manouvre their respective governments enjoyed. They also
created and reinforced habits of Anglo-American cooperation and dialogue. During the
Second World War – the high point  of  the CFR-RIIA’s cooperation – the two groups’
leaders  together  and  with  their  respective  governments  planned  the  postwar
international institutional architecture that became known as the Bretton Woods system:
the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and
Development (IBRD, or World Bank) and the United Nations.86 In regard to the latter, the
role of the CFR as an organisation, and of Isaiah Bowman, is well-documented. It is clear
that, for Bowman and the CFR, the UN was for the maintenance of national security and
international  organisation  would  be  the  route  to  avoiding  “conventional  forms  of
imperialism.”87 American  power  would  be  exercised  through  an  American-led
“international” system.
53 Building, and modelled, on that core cooperation between CFR and RIIA, there developed
from  the  1920s  momentum  behind  an  institutes-of-international  affairs  ‘movement’.
Institutes developed in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa as well as Italy,
Belgium, Holland, Germany and France. Adapted to their own domestic conditions, these
institutes received funding from the major American foundations,88 because their general
aims were similar to the foundations’ own conception of international affairs at a time of
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increasing  nationalist  rivalries,  economic  autarchy,  and  military  conflict:  to  increase
international dialogue to avert war and economic depression, and to build international
habits of mind and activity.89 As Dobell and Willmott conclude, the institutes represented
the founding generation of a “transnational elite” that went onto play important roles in
laying the foundations of the contemporary world order.90
54 Even  more  than  that,  however,  foundation  elites  aimed  at  building  international
associations of democratic countries as bulwarks against aggression and militarism. Their
schemes are interesting as they have, since the end of the cold war, once again become
fashionable. Today’s US-mooted ‘community/concert/league of democracies’91 (and the
less well-known but interesting ‘Anglosphere’)92 had its 1930s counterpart: Federal Union.
Championed by New York Times journalist, Clarence Streit, and Chatham House’s Lionel
Curtis, Federal Union (FU, between Britain – and its imperial subjects, America, Canada,
South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian nations) was conceived of as a
union of democratic, peace-loving, nations of ‘advanced’ peoples, a 1930s version of
democratic peace theory in action.93 Of course, despite high levels of sympathy among
British and American elites,  including Prime Minister Churchill,  Federal  Union never
came about. Nevertheless, it provides an insight to what Anglo-American elites thought
about the world and how they sought to act upon it. And the moving spirits behind the
movement  were  part  of  the  American  foundations’  far-flung  but  well-connected
networks. This was at a time of crisis for the League of Nations which had been powerless
to prevent Nazi and other aggressions, and a time of exploration of various schemes for
‘world order’. When war-time discussions began – within and between CFR-RIIA and their
respective foreign offices –  the core ideas/values of FU played an important role.94 The
leaders  of  the  institutes  of  international  affairs  movement  and   Federal  Union
overlapped,  as  did  their  funding sources.  Together,  they  made more  dense  the  elite
international  networks through which American foundation leaders sought to embed
their values in the international system.95
55 American foundations were major supporters of international cooperation in informal,
private associations. Such associations took the form of institutes of international affairs;
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  (IPR,  backed  by  the  Big  3  till  its  destruction  by
McCarthyites in the 1950s for allegedly “losing” China)96 for  discussions between the
powers of the Pacific rim, including imperial Britain; supporting the social justice aims of
the  International  Labour  Organisation  (ILO,  Carnegie  was  particularly  active  in  this
respect),97 and even building international legal institutions such as the Permanent Court
of Justice (once again, a significant Carnegie-backed project). American philanthropy also
supported  the  International  Studies  Conference  (ISC)  of  the  League  of  Nations’
International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) which, by 1945, had developed
into the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). While
James  Shotwell  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  served  as  the  American  committee’s
chairman (1932-43), the ISC and IIIC both received generous funding from the Rockefeller
and Carnegie foundations.98
56 The  foundations  were  themselves  international  organisations  or,  rather  national
organisations with international reach. The CEIP, for example, had a European office in
Paris as well as representation in Geneva (the headquarters of the League of Nations). The
Rockefeller Foundation was internationally-oriented from its earliest days, particularly in
relation to its work on illness and disease, but also its work with the American churches
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at home and overseas.99 The Carnegie Corporation, which was particularly active within
‘British’ Africa, had offices right across the continent.100
57 Finally,  the  foundation-supported  ‘area  studies’  programmes  provided  an  additional
avenue for ‘thickening’ American elite networks with other countries and strategic world
regions. John Ikenberry, referring to the building of the British empire in India, states
that “A necessary condition for the emergence of both informal and formal empire is the
explicit,  physical  penetration  of  peripheral  society  by  metropolitan  agents.  Whether
officials, soldiers, traders, financiers, or missionaries [to these add professors, research
fellows  and  doctoral  students]  these  agents  serve  as  the  medium  through  which
socialization occurs.”101 Postwar US-based area studies programmes provide an excellent
example of such “socialisation”. 
58 Building on American domestic area studies networks – with their attendant professional
societies, journals, and conferences – foundations funded network-construction in target
regions and countries. That is, foundations encouraged field-based studies by American
scholars in Africa,  Asia and Latin America, as well as building prestigious “centres of
excellence” and expertise in those regions.102 Doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships were
established,  beginning a flow or circulation of  scholars and students around US elite
university-based networks, with the usual multiplier effects.103 Whole careers were built
by the tremendous levels of funding from the Ford Foundation through its Foreign Areas
Fellowship Programme, for example. These networks helped to create and sustain bonds
of scholarly cooperation between elite American universities area studies (and other)
programmes, the US Department of State, and strategic overseas regions.104
59 It was through such network flows – of money, scholars, and ideas – that “modernisation”
theory was established as the paradigm for the economic development of “backward”
countries during the 1950s to 1970s period.105 Strongly driven by cold war competition, as
well as the historic American desire for global hegemony, modernisers favoured market-
oriented,  non-nationalist  and non-communist  roads  to  economic  development  in  the
Third  World.  An  excellent  example  of  such  thinking,  and  its  underlying  political
assumptions, is represented in a confidential 1954 memorandum to CIA director, Allen
Dulles, from Max Millikan and Walt Rostow. In it, they argue that the American economy
can  continue  to  grow  only  if  the  world  economy  grows.  Specifically,  the
“underdeveloped”  regions  needed  “the  mobilization  of  capital;  the  development  of
‘know-how’,”  among other  things.  For  the latter,  Millikan and Rostow recommended
“international  collaborations  between universities,  management  associations,  medical
societies, and trade unions for education, research, and training.” All this could only be
achieved through a system of international organisation, including the UN and the ILO.
Although  denying  any  intention  of  interfering  in  other  countries’  internal  affairs,
Millikan  and  Rostow added  that  the  United  States  must  develop  “an  [international]
environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve.”
106     
60 Collaborations between Ford-funded American economists and Indonesian economists in
the 1950s and 1960s, for example, had profound effects on that nation’s political and
economic development, especially after the overthrow of the leftist-nationalist, Sukarno,
in  1966.107 Similar  outcomes  may also  be  noted with regard to  Rockefeller  and Ford
funded social scientists in Chile before and after the military coup by General Pinochet in
1973.108 The ideological, ideational, and institutional collaborations at the heart of these
networks  integrated Third World elites,  or  at  least  important  sections  of  them,  into
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American (and western) networks, promoting non-national, cosmopolitan logics among
them as well as the promise of well-funded research programmes and prestigious careers.
61 American power advanced during the twentieth-century in large measure due to the
indefatigable  efforts  of  liberal  internationalists  to  construct  rules-based international
associations  that  were frequently  US-led but  which also  permitted the expression of
others’ national interests and viewpoints. Writing about the 1950s, Ikenberry argues that
the United States “turned power into order and domination into legitimate authority.”109
It is argued here that the hectic programme of 1950s international organisation-building
was conducted by many who had cut their teeth on building the ILO or IPR or ISC or
Federal Union in the 1920s and 1930s or by foundation funded wartime planners attached
to the CFR or FPA. They had been dedicated to this activity since the US Senate’s refusal
to permit American membership of the League of Nations in 1920. Yet, they educated and
socialised Americans at home for internationalism and committed money and time to
fostering  habits  and  institutions  of  international  collaboration,  a  kind  of  counter-
hegemony within the very heartlands of isolationism.110 After World War I, the political
space  within  the  US,  Britain  and  France  for  internationalism  was  indeed  narrow:
nationalism was the order of the day ideologically and economically. After 1945, however,
the domestic space for internationalism – ideologically and economically – was broad: no
return to the 1930s was considered possible, let alone desirable. Ideological preferences
and material incentives lay in internationalism; hence the success of post-1945 efforts at a
rules-based international order. In effect, this process “embedded liberalism” into the
very fabric of the international order.111 The need of a hegemon, however, remained and
the United States was willing to shoulder the “responsibility” of global leadership.
 
Global networks
62 The  historical  experience  of  building  national  and  international  networks  finds  its
contemporary expression in the hectic bid to create a global order that suits, extends and
defends globalising capitalism, a system of “market democracies”, headed by the United
States.112 As Thomas Friedman argues, the world today is characterised by “integration
and webs” as well as an unequal distribution of benefits. Effective globalisation requires a
global institutional architecture as well as a supportive global civil society, more or less
for the same reasons that an industrialising and ‘nationalising’ America 100 years ago
required a national civil  society – a series of densely networked publics composed of
strategic minorities  – to provide its  social  base.  The Big 3 foundations,  among other
newer American foundations, are at the very heart of these developments today. They are
actively  supporting  existing  international  organisations  and  promoting  new
organisations  more  suited  to  global  conditions,  as  they  see  them and wish  them to
develop. The overall strategy remains unchanged, even as programmes and personnel
change:  Americanised or American-led globalisation remains the aim. It  is  also clear,
however, that American foundations are not alone in this venture, though they remain
the most significant.
63 American philanthropy,  by  virtually  every  measure,  tops  the  world  league,  although
foundations  are  now  a  feature  of  practically  every  continent.  There  has  been  a
proliferation in the number of US foundations, the variety of grant-making activities, and
total philanthropic assets. Since 1987 the number of foundations in the U.S. has grown
from 28,000 to about 50,000. The new foundations hold some of the enormous growth in
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wealth that has been created recently in the US. Their assets have expanded from $115
billion in 1987 to over $300 billion today. Their international giving also topped $3 billion
in 2002. Record increases in international philanthropic giving have been recorded since
the mid-1990s, due to a strong world economy and the rise of new fortunes, especially Bill
Gates’s Microsoft Corporation,  as witnessed by the formation of the Bill  and Melinda
Gates foundation. The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, however, dealt a temporary
blow to the trend, although they also focused greater attention among foundations to the
global sources of domestic problems, especially the role of poverty and inequality.113
64 Increasingly, like their US counterparts, European, Japanese and Australian foundations
are  engaging in  international  activities.  There  are  over  60,000  foundations  currently
operating in the “old 15” EU states. In Italy, of the over 3000 foundations surveyed by the
European Foundation Centre (EFC), half were founded after 1999. Over 40% of German
foundations were set up in the decade up to 2004. Their combined assets total over £100
billion,  with  the  Wellcome  Trust  topping  the  league  with  assets  of  £10  billion.
Increasingly, European foundations are engaging in cross-border and global activities,
with 30% already doing so and 68% expressing an interest in doing so in the future.
Further legal reforms to simplify and incentivise international philanthropy is the subject
of reform campaigns backed by the major foundation networks. The EFC’s Europe in The
World initiative – to project European philanthropic and political-cultural influence onto
a global stage to compete with and complement the Americans – is the principal motor
behind  new  developments  that  have  seen  increased  linkages  between  European
foundations and international organisations (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, United Nations Children’s Fund, UN Development Program), corporations
(such  as  Shell),  and  an  array  of  global  networks  such  as  Community  Philanthropy
Initiative,  Transatlantic  Community  Foundation  Network,  the  World  Development
Movement, and the Network of European Foundations for Innovative Cooperation. The
world is dense with foundations, foundation networks, and networks of networks.114
65 In the era of America’s rise to globalism, the foundations constructed and promoted, at
home  and  abroad,  liberal-internationalist versions  of  Americanism.  In  the  era  of
globalisation, they promote a “transnationalised” Americanism that backs the neo-liberal
project but seeks to blunt its harsher edges.115 The foundations today are replicating their
historical  strategies at home and abroad;  they seek to protect the existing system of
power by engaging in activities to ameliorate the negative consequences of that very
system of  which they are  a  central  component  and beneficiaries.116  As  a  “Break-out
session  [on]  Globalization”  at  a  meeting  of  the  International  Network  for  Strategic
Philanthropy  (INSP)  concluded,  “foundations  portfolios  have  benefited  from
globalization.”117 At the beginning of the twentieth-century, the foundations targetted
the alleviation of domestic poverty and the slum – brought on by American urbanisation
and capitalist industrialisation; today they focus on the world-wide social fallout of neo-
liberal globalisation strategies.118
66 The IMF and the World Bank are widely considered, along with the US Treasury, to be the
motors of neoliberal globalisation.119 The former two organisations – formed at Bretton
Woods in 1944-45 with full support from the Rockefeller/Carnegie foundations – continue
to garner sponsorship and sustenance from east coast philanthropy. As is shown below,
the World Bank has received grants from the Ford Foundation, while David Rockefeller
has been a consistent IMF stalwart.120
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67 As was historically the case when American foundations often carried out programmes
that the state would not or could not, it is also the case today – with the dramatic loss of
state legitimacy associated with the rise of free market liberalism, privatisation, etc… -
that  non-state  actors  are  scurrying  to  perform  key  functions.  The  proliferation  of
domestic  and  international  non-governmental  organisations,  the  rise  of  the  “third
sector”, is partly explained by the “rollback” of state social support programmes in the
wake of Reaganomics and Thatcherism. Offsetting the fallout of increasing gaps between
rich  and  poor  has  become  a  key  foundation  task,  especially  by  backing  “pivotal
institutions that can shape behaviour away from risk factors and dangerous directions [i.e.,
anti-Americanism  and  anti-globalisation  protests],”  according  to  the  Carnegie
Corporation.121 Part of the solution is seen to lie in “promoting democracy, market reform
and the creation of civil institutions…”122, that is, in the neo-liberal project itself. Carnegie
actively promoted, during the 1990s, “Partnerships for Global Development”, headed by
prestigious academics, scientists and politicians, that promoted liberalisation of markets
as a core concern. Contrary to Peet et al, neo-liberal globalisation’s foundation-backers do
not see a wide gulf between neo-liberalism and its critics: by their social amelioration
policies, they hope/claim to promote the market and social justice.123
68 In  the  same vein,  the  Rockefeller  Foundation declared in  1985 that  social  inequality
reduction lay at the heart of its economic developmental concerns. In 1999, the incoming
president  of  RF,  former vice-chancellor  of  the University  of  Sussex,  Gordon Conway,
stressed that the foundation had two priorities: “first, to understand the processes of
change spurred by globalization and second, to find ways that the poor and excluded will
not be left out.” Inherent in both foundations’ attitudes is the taken-for-granted neo-
liberal character of globalisation.124 Therefore, it is unsurprising that the third of what
some may call an “unholy trinity”, the Ford Foundation, granted the Hudson Institute, a
conservative think tank, $150,000 to assist “economists and officials of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania [to] develop plans to transform their economies and integrate them into
the world economy.”125 To examine the consequences of market reforms, the Rockefeller
Foundation administered a project, at a cost of $150,000, toward “an exploration on trade
liberalization and its impacts on poor farmers.”126
69 The  American  foundations  are  important  supporters  of  the  key  engines  of  the
globalisation  process,  as  their  records  show.  For  example,  Ford  awarded  a  grant  of
$400,000 to the World Bank to fund the latter’s “Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
to develop the capacity of microfinance institutions and improve member donor practices
in supporting microfinance.”127 Microfinance is a strategy for lifting into the marketplace
those too poor to get loans from mainstream commercial  banks.  In 1999,  RF granted
$800,000  to  the  World  Bank’s  Economic  Development  Institute  for  economic  growth
acceleration strategies.128 Further Ford grants were made in 2003 to institutions that try
to build interconnections between large Western corporations and small enterprises in
the  third  world.129 During  the  1990s,  the  head  of  the  Rockefeller  family  –  David
Rockefeller – offered unconditional support for the International Monetary Fund’s global
programmes: without the IMF, the world would return to the economic crises of the 1930s
and the threat of global economic and military conflicts.130 A grant of $250,000 aimed to
finance “strategic workshops and meetings among Asian government officials, academics
and civil society groups on the governance of the World Trade Organisation”, another
motor of globalisation processes.131
Foundation Networks and American Hegemony
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
19
70 The American foundations are globalising forces in their own right too – historically and
today.132 They consciously finance and strengthen global knowledge networks between
universities, think tanks, research centres, government agencies, and philanthropies.133
The International  Network for Strategic Philanthropy (INSP) – set  up by the German
Bertelsmann Foundation – with US foundations’ support – encourages the global spread
of  philanthropy.  The  (American)  Philanthropy  Initiative,  Inc.,  aims  to  ensure  the
“strategic  and  systematic  investment  of  private  philanthropic  resources  to  address
complex, interconnected manifestations of chronic underdevelopment” At the forefront
of encouraging global giving are the American Big Three. RF has backed several initiatives
to train a new generation of global givers, “promising leaders in the field of philanthropy
and civil society.” Similar programmes are run by the Ford, Hewlett, Kellogg and Charles
Stewart  Mott  Foundations.  Even philanthropy-strengthening groups  have  access  to  a
network  of  support  groups  such  as  the  Council  on  Foundations  and  the  European
Foundation Center. The global givers are further networked with regional and national
philanthropies, such as the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, and to international
networks and associations, such as the World Economic Forum, which in turn, has its own
global social investors programme.134
71 In that context, the grants information that follows proves to be just the tip of a very
large iceberg. The Ford Foundation granted $400,000 to the Academy for the Development
of Philanthropy in Poland (ADPP) – which grew out of a USAID project -  in order to
strengthen foundations locally. A Ford grant of $220,000 supports efforts to link-up Polish
and Belarusian NGOs. Relatedly, Ford awarded $500,000 to the Brazilian Association of
NGOs to help organise the World Social Forum (WSF), a body that tries to develop “social
and economic alternatives to current patterns of globalization.”135
72 The Ford Foundation is  an enthusiastic  though controversial  supporter  of  the World
Social  Forum (WSF),  an international  network of  liberal-reformist  globalisers.  Indeed,
private corporate and philanthropic funders are the second largest donors to the WSF,
acting as a brake on WSF’s critique of capitalist globalisation.136 FF has invested well over
$1,000,000 directly  in WSF to help it  organise  events  and globally  to  disseminate its
message.137  At  its  third  annual  meeting,  WSF  attracted  100,000  delegates  from  156
countries  –  feminists,  trades  unionists,  church-men and so on.  According to Michael
Edwards, director of the Ford Foundation’s Governance and Civil Society unit, WSF has
changed the “terms of the debate about globalization…. There’s [now] an inescapable
public  debate  about  the  role  of  corporations  and  the  distribution  of  globalization’s
benefits…. largely due to the W.S.F. crew.”138 WSF, with the FF’s and others’ sponsorship,
promotes critiques of some of the “negative side effects of market liberalization: growing
economic disparity, the privatization of health care and environmental degradation.” The
ultimate aim, according to Ford’s Edwards,  is a “global civil  society” the influence of
which would bear comparison to the impact of  the Bretton Woods system formed in
World  War  II.139 WSF  aims  to  construct  “an  alternative  development  model  and  to
construct a new form of globalization,” as opposed to rejecting globalisation per se.140 A
Carnegie  Corporation  grant  of  $25,000  assists  “dialogue  on  globalization  between
representatives of the World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum.”141 A Ford
grant to the London School of Economics of $500,000 aims to help scholars explore “the
depth of global governance and its accountability to a polity,” another reformist measure
promoted by all three major US foundations.142
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73 The WSF, however, is the subject of much criticism. For example, MumbaiResistance, a
radical Indian organisation opposed to capitalist globalisation, argues that the WSF is
funded by  western  agencies  “to  mitigate  the  disastrous  projects  of  development
cooperation and structural adjustment programmes” they have themselves organised.143
It is claimed that the sponsors of the WSF have co-opted anti-globalisation forces and
channelled them away from “direct and militant confrontation… into discussions and
debates that are often sterile, and mostly unfocused and aimless.” Some participants at
WSF meetings complain that they are expected mostly to “listen” to WSF leaders rather
than to participate; the aim was “putting a human face on globalization.” The World Bank
refers to the WSF as “a maturing social movement” and the Bank’s officials have been
granted observer status at WSF meetings.  WSF’s supporters include Brazil’s  President
Lula,  head  of  the  Workers’  Party  and  proponent  of  IMF  policies  and  US  free  trade
agreements, and opponent of peasants’ land struggles. WSF is, ultimately, a “safety valve”
trying to blunt the harsher edges of capitalist globalisation.144 The 2004 organisers of WSF
meetings, in Mumbai, India, refused Ford’s donations because of Ford’s role in India’s
Green  Revolution  which  created  and  exacerbated  the  problems  of  poor  farmers.145
Gramscians argue that the major states, global corporations and philanthropies and other
forces are a “a nascent historic bloc” that develop policy and “propagate the ideology of
globalization”, even within organisations that are promoted as alternatives to it.146
 
A New American-led Networked World Order
74 Though the foundations’ vision and operations may be more ‘transnational’ today, their
attachment to US global leadership remains undiminished. Therefore, recognition of the
power  of  global  networks  –  an  aspect  of  America’s  ‘soft  power’  –  is  now central  to
American foreign policy, especially noticeable since the inauguration of President Barack
Obama, who appointed Princeton’s Anne-Marie Slaughter to the directorship of the State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Slaughter has been advancing the networked power
concept, in which America has the edge over other powers, since the 1990s. Her book, A
New World Order (2003), leadership (with John Ikenberry) of the, in part, Ford Foundation-
funded147 Princeton Project  on National  Security  (PPNS,  2004-06)  which promoted to
policymakers intergovernmental networks as a means of global influence, and article in
Foreign  Affairs (2009),  suggests  that  the  Obama  administration  will  formalise  a  long-
standing practice:  state-led networks that  collaborate with and mobilise  elite  private
networks. “…[T]he measure of power is connectedness,” Slaughter contends, and “… the
state with the most connections will be the central player, able to set the global agenda….
Here, the United States has a clear and sustainable edge… The twenty-first century looks
increasingly like another American century….”148
75 Unsurprisingly, in the Princeton Project’s Final report, Slaughter and Ikenberry urged the
United States to mobilize the power of its global networks: “We should establish and
institutionalize  networks  of  national,  regional,  and  local  government  officials  and
nongovernmental representatives to create numerous channels for [democratic] nations
and others to work on common problems and to communicate and inculcate the values
and practices that safeguard liberty under law”.149 The aim is to intersect “international
institutions and domestic governments… institutions providing incentives and pressure
to help conquer dysfunctional levels of corruption and bolster the rule of law…”150 State-
private networks in deep collaboration – a development that the foundations have been
Foundation Networks and American Hegemony
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
21
fostering for  decades.  As  Ford’s  Michael  Edwards notes,  though states  make treaties,
“transnational networks are essential to enforce compliance….”151
76 There is an expansive sense of “America” in the Princeton Project’s reportwhen it argues
that “U.S. borders [should] be defined for some purposes as extending to the port of
shipment rather than the port of entry….[American officials should also]… strengthen the
quality and capacity of a foreign government to control its territory and enforce its laws,”
a necessary corollary to “defining our borders beyond those established by land and sea.”
152 
 
Conclusion
77 Networks  are  powerful  instruments  that  produce  hegemonic  results.  Foundations’
networks  have  played powerful  roles  in  their  own right,  merely  by  virtue  of  being.
Powerful  systems for socialising and integrating intellectual  talent,  they are also the
producers of prestigious knowledge as well as strategic gatekeepers. They draw people in
and marginalise others.  They give full  meaning to the expression that “knowledge is
power”. 
78 American hegemony, or at least concerted attempts at it over the past nearly 100 years, is
in  part  built  on  the  focused  and  systematic  work  of  foundations’  network-building
activities, alongside the material incentives that network funders offer, and the prestige
membership in them confers. Even so, the role of crises or catalytic events is critical; it
provides  the  impetus  for  policy  shifts  or  for  the  allocation of  even larger  resources
behind a particular programme.
79 Within those contexts, foundation network building developed from national, through
international, to global proportions. The foundations are now trying to do at the global
level – a system of relatively strong states but weak international institutions and global
civil society – what they successfully achieved (in alliance with other social, economic and
political forces) within the United States over the course of the first half of the twentieth
century. The United States was at that time characterised by strong states and a weak
federal centre with little that could be called a ‘civil society’ at the national level. At the
core of their activities remains their attachment to networks, their master technology
that,  they  claim,  stands  above  business  interest,  politics,  the  American  state,  and
ideology. Their fictions remain intact to this day. Of course, they also remain American
organisations, wedded to the largest American global corporations, the American state,
and to an enlightened, but nevertheless, selfish approach to world politics, attempting
still  to  promote  and  consolidate  American  hegemony  within  what  they  consider  “a
benign international environment”.
80 This article shows the degree to which American power is best understood as an intense
collaboration between the state and private elites, thus undermining Realist and pluralist
accounts of power. The former’s focus on state power and the latter’s on the power of
private special interests does not sit well with the evidence presented above. This is not
to argue that state power has withered away; it is rather to emphasise that the operation
of  power  pays  little  heed  to  either/or  propositions.  Herein  lies  the  significance  of
Gramsci’s concept of state spirit that transcends the state-private divide and coheres the
American hegemony-building project.  State spirit  also speaks to the issue of  “inside/
outside” factors in political outcomes. This article shows increasingly internationally and
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globally oriented groups, rooted in an American liberal vision of a seamless domestic and
global  order,  actively  constructing US hegemony,  blurring the so-called state-private
divide. Realism is undermined to a degree as domestic forces – state and private – develop
a vision and build an international order in line with Americanism, and not only the
‘logic’ of the interstate system.153   
81 Network  power  coheres  the  American  hegemonic  project  and  has  also  permitted/
furnished the institutional agility required to navigate crises. The state-private network
operations discussed above show how foundations coped with the isolationist 1920s and
1930s,  when they were politically marginal,  to the extent that they fostered counter-
hegemonic networks capable of taking advantage of political opportunities afforded by
crises,  such  as  the  1930s  depression  and  the  Japanese  attacks  on  Pearl  Harbor  in
December 1941, as well as during the Cold War and post-Cold war periods. That is, they
have  proved  adaptable,  successful  organisations  essential  to  the  development  and
exercise of American hegemony.
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ABSTRACTS
The  major  American  foundations  constructed  and  sustained  the  rich  texture  of  cooperative
social,  intellectual  and  political  relations  between  key  actors  and  institutions  supportive  of
specific modes of thought that promoted US hegemony. Foundations also fostered and developed
the attractive power-knowledge networks that not only radiated intellectual influence but also
attracted some of the most creative minds. Finally, liberal internationalist foundations fostered
globalism  even  when  the  American  state  was  ‘isolationist’,  and  when  US  influence  abroad
unwelcome. Their significance in American hegemony building lay in their sustained, long-term
cooperative  relationship  with  the  American state  through which they helped build  national,
international and global institutions and networks. The latter process evidences the most significant
impact of US foundations – the building of the domestic and international infrastructure for liberal
internationalism  which  has  transformed  into  a  kind  of  “social  neoliberalism”.  Theoretical
conclusions follow from these claims: the sustained and deep cooperation between the state and
foundations suggests that we must revise our views of “how power works” in the United States
and therefore influences its foreign relations. Therefore, the article shows that elite networks,
consisting of state officials and private citizens are powerful means by which foreign policy shifts
may be prepared, elite and mass opinion primed and mobilised, new consensus built, ‘old’ forces
marginalised, and US hegemony constructed.
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